Smith’s book is structured according to five basic questions: What is
religion? What causal powers does religion produce? How does religion
work?; Why are humans religious? and What is religion’s future? The
simplicity of this structure is misleading because the author is well aware
that he is dealing with a complex subject. He also confesses to being an
outsider (etic) to particular religious traditions, but he aspires to take
seriously the insider’s (emic) perspective. According to Smith, religion can be
defined as practices grounded in presuppositions about the existence and nature
of superhuman powers that can manifest themselves as personal or impersonal. He
claims that his focus on practices rather than beliefs distinguishes his theory
from others.  


Chapter 4 discusses why humans are religious and allows the author to stress
the naturalness of religion. Smith argues that religion gives people a
chance to realize certain goods and avoid what is deemed bad. Smith
identifies six natural goods: (1) bodily survival, security, and pleasure;
(2) knowledge of reality; (3) identity coherence and affirmation;
(4) exercising purposive agency; (5) moral affirmation; (6) social
community and love. These natural goods are also teleological ends that
enable humans to extend human power beyond natural limitations. Smith
argues that humans are naturally religious in certain ways, but they do not
share a religion gene, although differences of practice can be traced to
biologically grounded genetic and neurological traits that shape
differences among religious cultures.


In the final chapter on the future of religion. Smith offers an optimistic
portrait of its future. He cannot imagine a time without religion,
phenomena like secularization and pluralism notwithstanding. Based on history,
we can expect the development of new religions, the growth of some religions,
the decline of others, and that current religions will be transformed over time.
Smith is suggesting that religion is a dynamic and not a static entity.
Without any apparent trepidation, Smith asks about the
possible reductionism of his theory. He denies that it is reductionistic
“because it does not deny the possibility that the truth claims of any
religion are correct” (80). Many theorists of religion would find such a
statement problematic, because all interpretations of religion are
reductionistic to some degree (though Smith does acknowledge an
explanatory reductionism). Another possible area of disagreement with other
theorists is over the issue of subjective experience. It has been noted
that Smith stresses public practices over subjective experience because
they concern religiousness that he calls subjective appropriation.
Overall, this is a lucidly written book that should be widely read by
students of religion. It should prove a welcome theory for those looking
for a contribution to the social scientific study of religion. Besides its
clarity, the author gives his readers much to think about and consider with
regards to their own understanding of the nature of religion. The author’s
illustrations of particular religions are well chosen to support his
theory. It is enjoyable and helpful to read someone applying an analytical
and realist approach that elucidates the subject. Thus, I would recommend
this book to anyone interested in the issue of the theory of religion and
a refining of Riesebrodt’s sociology of religion.
On a personal level, my interest in this book was raised when I noticed how
many times Smith used the term “power,” which he defines as the means to
make things happen or to prevent them from happening. In this respect,
power affords humans a rationale for producing religion. He adds that human
powers are those that cannot achieve what supernatural powers can. This
is fine, as far as it goes, but Smith never really makes an attempt to tell
the reader what power is in itself. In other words, if a scholar is
offering an analytical, sociological, and realist approach to the theory of
religion, it does not seem unreasonable to expect a more substantial definition
of a key element. Another shortcoming with this work is that it is obvious
to a student making a superficial study of the subject that religion works
by telling narratives about specific religions.
In many religious traditions, narratives enable particular religions to
identify themselves and to distinguish themselves from other religions. In
addition, on many levels of the phenomenon of religion,
subjective experience assumes an essential role. Because of this role, it
seems wise to hold subjective experiences in tension with practices that
would hold in relationship individual and social subjective aspects with
public practices. Moreover, the public practices that are so essential to
Smith’s theory are obviously performed by embodied humans, an aspect that
is not substantially discussed by the author. These four critical points
are not, however, major reservations for rejecting the value of this book,
which can still stand on its own substantial theoretical foundation. Based on
the attitude expressed in his book, Smith would welcome being read from a
critical perspective and taken seriously by
readers.

• To Flourish or Destruct:
  A
  Personalist Theory of Human Goods, Motivations, Failure, and
  Evil 
• What Is a Person? Rethinking Humanity, Social Life, and the
  Moral Good
  from the Person Up.